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Abstract 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) are a pow­
erful formalism for reasoning under uncer­
tainty but bear some severe limitations: they 
require a large amount of information be­
fore any reasoning process can start, they 
have limited contradiction handling capabil­
ities, and their ability to provide explana­
tions for their conclusion is still controversial. 
There exists a class of reasoning systems, 
called 11-uth Maintenance Systems (TMSs), 
which are able to deal with partially speci­
fied knowledge, to provide well-founded ex­
planation for their conclusions, and to detect 
and handle contradictions. TMSs incorporat­
ing measure of uncertainty are called Belief 
Maintenance Systems (BMss). This paper de­
scribes how a BMS based on probabilitistic 
logic can be applied to BBNs, thus introduc­
ing a new class of BBNs, called Ignorant Be­
lief Networks, able to incrementally deal with 
partially specified conditional dependencies, 
to provide explanations, and to detect and 
handle contradictions. 
1 Introduction 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) are a powerful for­
malism for reasoning under uncertainty. They have 
been summarized by Pearl (Pearl, 1988), but they have 
been independently developed by several researchers 
during the past few years. BBNs have been successfully 
applied to several domains, from medical diagnosis to 
natural language understanding. 
A BBN is a direct acyclic graph in which nodes repre­
sent stochastic variables and arcs represent conditional 
dependencies among the variables. BBNs are particu­
larly appealing since they are based on a sound prob­
abilistic semantics and they are the reasoning cores of 
complete decision making systems, called Inffuence Di­
agrams. From a probabilistic point of view, they pro­
vide a straightforward way to represent dependency 
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and independence assumptions among variables, thus 
making easier the representation and the acquisition 
of knowledge. 
Despite a considerable success, BBNs bear some severe 
limitations: 
Ignorance: They require a large amount of infor­
mation. The number of conditional probabili­
ties needed to specify a conditional dependency 
grows exponentially with the number of parent 
variables. This effect leads to serious difficulties 
since all the conditionals probabilities defining a 
conditional dependency among variables, as well 
as all the prior probabilities for the root variables, 
have to be known before any reasoning process 
can start. Moreover, each probability assignment 
expresses in a single number both the belief about 
an event and the reliability of such a belief. Both 
these limitations arise from the inability of BBNs 
to distinguish between uncertainty and ignorance. 
Explanation: The ability of BBNs to provide an ex­
planation for their conclusions is still controver­
sial, and it represents a challenge for researchers 
in the area. 
Consistency: BBNs improve over the traditional 
scheme of Bayesian expert systems (Charnia.k, 
1991), since they ensure that if a network is locally 
consistent, it is also globally consistent. Problems 
arise when an inconsistent probability value is as­
signed, because they do not provide any efficient 
contradiction handling method. It would be bet­
ter if they were able to identify the set of incon­
sistent assignments and ask for the retraction of 
one (or some) of them. 
Researchers in Artificial Intelligence have developed a 
class of reasoning systems, called 11-uth Maintenance 
Systems (TMss) (McAllester, 1990), which are able 
to deal with partially specified knowledge, to provide 
well-founded explanation for their conclusions, and to 
detect and handle contradictions (Forbus and de Kleer, 
1992). 
During the past decade, three main classes of TMSs 
have emerged: Justification-based TMSs (JTMss) 
(Doyle, 1979), Assumption-based TMSs (ATMSs) 
(de Kleer, 1986a), and Logic-based TMSs (LT:Mss) 
(McAllester, 1980). A JTMS records derivability de­
pendencies among propositions and propagates binary 
truth-values along chains of dependencies. The ATMS 
also records derivability dependencies among proposi­
tions, but rather than propagating truth-values it la­
bels each proposition with the minimal consistent set 
of assumptions under which it can be derived. On 
the other hand, a LTMS manipulates full propositional 
formulas built from propositions and truth-functional 
connectives, rather than networks of dependencies, 
and propagates truth-values using a unit resolution 
style algorithm called Boolean Constraint Propagation 
(scP) (McAllester, 1990). 
Several attempts have been made to include prob­
abilities in TMSs. TMSs that are able to reason 
on the basis of probabilistic rather than binary 
truth-values are called Belief Maintenance Systems 
(sMss). Falkenhainer (Falkenhainer, 1986) devel­
oped a Justification-based BMS, introducing Dempster­
Shafer (Shafer, 1976) belief functions in a JTMS. De 
Kleer and Williams (de Kleer and Williams, 1987) 
augmented the ATMS formalism with probability mea­
sures. Laskey and Lehner (Laskey and Lehner, 1989) 
proved a formal equivalence between the belief of 
a proposition computed by a Dempster-Shafer func­
tion and the probability of the ATMS-label of the 
proposition, and they provide a correct algorithm for 
computing the beliefs of these labels. D'Ambrosio 
(D'Ambrosio, 1987) exploited the ATMS architecture 
to compute a special case of belief functions. 
We have extended the third class of TMSs to proba­
bility, thus producing a Logic-based BMS(LBMS) (Ra­
moni and Riva, 1993). This paper will describe how 
this method for belief maintenance can be applied to 
BBNs, thus introducing a new class of BBNs able to 
incrementally deal with partially specified conditional 
dependencies and prior probabilities, to provide well­
founded explanations for their conclusions, and to de­
tect and handle contradictions. 
2 Logic-based Belief Maintenance 
In this section, we will summarize the description of a 
new kind of BMS, called logic-based BMS, in which the 
Boolean operators of standard logic act as constraints 
on the probabilistic truth-values of propositions. The 
LBMS can be regarded as a generalization to interval 
truth-values of t he BCP used by the LTMS. As the LTMS 
is based on standard propositional calculus, the LBMS 
is based on the (propositional fragment of) probabilis­
tic logic. 
2.1 Preliminaries 
The LBMS assumes a propositional language defined by 
an infinite set of atomic propositions S = { a11 • • •  , an} 
and by the standard Boolean operators-., V, A,:::::>, and 
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:::. A literal is an atomic proposition a; or its negation 
-.a;. An atomic proposition a; is a positive literal and 
the negation of an atomic proposition -.a; is a negative 
literal. A clause is a finite disjunction of literals. We 
will use the term formula to refer to a generic legal 
sentence in the language, and we will denote them with 
/1, !2, . . .. When no ambiguity can arise, we will refer 
to atomic propositions simply as propositions. The 
LBMS knows also a distinguished subset of propositions 
A C S called assumptions. An assumption is a literal 
initially set as having a particular truth-value. 
We now need an evaluation function over the formu­
las of our language. We first introduce an additive 
real-valued function P0(f;) = p satisfying the axioms 
of conventional probability calculus. Unfortunately, 
Boolean operators are unable to constrain propositions 
to point-valued probability. Given Po(il V /2) = p, 
Po(il) and P0(fz) can range between 0 and p. Hence, 
the evaluation function for our language has to be a 
function P(f;) = [p. p"] such that for any formula /; 
of our language, P• :::; p ::; p0• The function P(f;) as­
signs to /i an interval truth-value: we will denote with 
P.(f;) = p. and P"(f;) = p• the lower and the upper 
bounds of the function P(f;) = [p. p"], respectively. 
2.2 Probabilistie Logie 
Probabilistic logic (Nilsson, 1986) provides a semantic 
framework for extending the standard (Boolean) con­
cept of satisfaction to a probabilistic one, that can be 
interpreted in terms of the Venn Diagram represen­
tation of the probability of a proposition. The prob­
ability P0(a;) of a proposition a, is bounded by the 
following inequality: 
Inequality (1) may be regarded as the probabilistic in­
terpretation of modus ponens: from Po(ai) = Pl and 
Po(ai :::::>a;) :::::: P2 we can derive bounds of probability 
representing the truth-value of a;. Moreover, it is a 
special case of a more general inequality that applies 
to any clause. Let C = V'::1 a; be a clause, the prob­
ability of a; is bounded by the following inequality: 
Po(C)- LPo(ai)::; Po(a;)::; Po(C) (2) 
#i 
The right hand side of (2) is obvious: no proposi­
tion may have a probability greater than the maxi­
mum probability of any disjunction it is part of. In 
set-theoretic terms, this means that a set cannot be 
larger than its union with other sets. The left hand 
side states that the minimum probability of a propo­
sition has to be equal to or greater than the difference 
between the probability of any clause C in which it ap­
pears and the probability of any literal appearing in C. 
Unfortunately, the constraints directly derived from 
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inequality (2) turn out to be too weak: the bounds 
they produce are too wide, thus including inconsistent 
values. The INFERNO system (Quinlan, 1983), that 
is usually regarded as a local approximation to proba­
bilistic logic (Pearl, 1988; Nilsson, 1993), exhibits this 
kind of behavior, in producing wider bounds. Because 
of that, INFERNO has been strongly criticized (Pearl, 
1988). 
2.3 Constraints 
The weakness of the constraints derived from (2) arises 
from too strong an enforcement of their locality based 
on the assumption that all proposition in a clause are 
pairwise disjoint and, in the Venn Diagram represen­
tation of a clause, the intersection of all propositions 
is always empty. It is apparent that this assumption 
is too strong. 
In order to drop this assumption, we need to represent 
this intersection among propositions in a clause. We 
call it overlapping factor. The overlapping factor of a 
clause C = v�=l ai is defined as 
1 
L: 
1 n 
L P(/\a�')·!!.(>.t, ... ,>.n) 
where { a1, ... , an} are atomic propositions, a1 
a0 = •a, and the function a is defined as: 
n 
a(>.1, . . . ,>.") = max{o,(L>.o) -1} 
i=l 
(3) 
a, 
In order to compute the overlapping factor of a clause 
C, we need to know the probability of those clauses 
that contain exactly the same set of atomic propo­
sitions, and hence to abandon the strict locality of 
clauses. 
Generalizing definition (2) to interval truth-values, we 
derived a set of constraints on the minimum and max­
imum probability of propositions (Ramoni and Riva, 
1993), by dropping the assumption that all literals in 
a clause are pairwise disjoint. 
The first constraint enforces the left hand side of (2). 
Constraint 1 The probability of a propmition ai m 
clause C i$ bounded by: 
P.(a,);::: P(C) +:Fe- 2:: P"(aj) 
j;f.i 
where :Fe i8 the overlapping factor of clau8e C. 
The second constraint is directly derived from the well 
known Additivity axiom which states that if a, is an 
atomic proposition, and { </>1, • • •  , tjJ2 .. } is the set of all 
the conjunctions that contain all possible combinations 
of the same n atomic propositions negated and un­
negated, then: 
2" 
P(ai) =:: LP(a, l\tjJ1) (4) 
i=l 
Constraint 2 The minimum probability of a propo8i­
tion a i8 bounded by: 
2" 
P.(a);::: 1- L(1 - P(•a V .p,)) 
i=l 
In constraint 2, we replaced the equality in (4) with 
an inequality because the constraint 2 holds also when 
only a subset of the clauses {( •a; V ljj1), . . .  , ( •a• V 
.P2")} is known, and causes P. (a.) to increase mono­
tonically as the number of known clauses increases. 
Hence, if -{-•a• V .Pi) is the clause obtained by the ap­
plication of De Morgan's laws, we have P* (a, 1\ ¢1) = 
1-P. ( ...,ai V .Pi). It is worth noting that the constraint 
2 subsumes the right hand side of inequality (2). 
From the definitions above, we can easily derive a def­
inition of inconsistency in the LBMS network. An in­
consistency can arise when, for any proposition a; in 
the network: 
(5) 
or when, for a clause C in the network: 
n 
LP"(a,)- :Fe< P.(C) (6) 
i=l 
Where :Fe is the overlapping factor of the clause C. If 
P.(ai) > P*(a,), then no probability function Po(a,) 
can exist such that P.(ai) ::; P0(a,) ::; P"(ai)· When 
condition (6) is met, there is no way to satisfy C since 
the sum of all maximum probabilities of propositions 
does not cover the minimum probability of C. 
2.4 Propagation 
In a LTMS, each clause represents a logical constraint 
on the truth-values of its propositions. To be satis­
fied, a clause must contain at least one proposition 
whose truth-value is consistent with its sign in the 
clause: true if the proposition appears unnegated in 
the clause, false if it appears negated. When all 
propositions but one violate their sign in a clause, the 
clause is said to be unit-open, and the LTMS forces 
the remaining proposition to have the truth-value in­
dicated by its sign, thus preventing the assignment 
of inconsistent truth-values. Contradiction may arise 
in two ways: a proposition is labeled both true and 
false or a clause is completely violated, i.e. each of 
its propositions has a truth-value opposite to its sign 
in the clause. In the LBMS, these two situations cor­
respond to the inconsistency conditions (5) and {6), 
respectively. 
In the LBMS, we have two constraints to apply. The 
constraint 2 is applied only when a new clause is added 
to the network. The application of this constraint ex­
ploits its incremental character. The current imple­
mentation uses a set of table1 each of which stores 
all the clauses containing the same set of proposi­
tions and the constraint is applied to each literal in 
the clause. Moreover, this method allows us to incre­
mentally record the overlapping factor of the clauses 
currently known by the LBMS. Constraint 1 is applied 
when the maximum probability of all the literals in the 
clause C but one is less than the probability of C. In 
this case, the clause is unit open, and the constraint in­
creases appropriately the minimum probability of the 
remaining literal. The algorithm for applying the con­
straint is basically a Waltz's propagation algorithm 
extended to intervals, and it is described in (Ramoni 
and Riva, 1993): each proposition is labeled with a 
set of possible values, and the constraints (in our case, 
the application of the above defined constraints to the 
clauses) are used to restrict this set. The LBMS can 
exhibit this behavior because if a clause is satisfied for 
a given truth-value of a proposition P(a,) = [p. p*], it 
will be satisfied for any subset of [p. p*]. This prop­
erty, which is implicit in the form of the inequalities in 
our constraints, implies a monotonic narrowing of the 
truth-values, thus ensuring the incrementality of the 
LBMS. 
2.5 Properties 
Extending the usual logical concepts of soundness and 
completeness from Boolean values to probability inter­
vals (Grosof, 1986), we can say that the system defined 
by the constraints 1 and 2 is probabilistically sound 
(i.e. it returns intervals that are equal to or wider 
than the intended ones), but it is not complete (i.e. it 
does not return intervals that are equal to or stricter 
than the intended ones). This incompleteness is due to 
the fact that the LBMS calculates the overlapping fac­
tor of a clause C using just a particular set of clauses 
(i.e., those that contain exactly the same set of atomic 
propositions as C) and does not exploit the other sets 
of clauses that define the overlapping factor of C, for 
example, the powerset of all propositions contained in 
clause C. 
There are two motivating factors behind the choice of 
this particular set of clauses. First of all, we found 
that the calculation of the overlapping factor is the 
only source of complexity in the LBMS which, being 
assimilable to the BCP, runs in linear time and space 
with respect to the number of clauses. Since we have 
devised an efficient method to calculate the overlap­
ping factor and to apply constraint 2, and since proba­
bilistic entailment is known to be intractable in nature 
(Nilsson, 1993), the incompleteness of the LBMS rep­
resents a compromise between functionality and effi­
ciency. Furthermore, the representation in the LBMS of 
a probabilistic model expressed in terms of conditional 
probabilitie1 produces a set of clauses that is exactly 
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the one needed to calculate the overlapping factor and 
to apply the constraint 2. The representation of con­
ditional probabilities in the LBMS is straightforward 
using the Chain Rule: 
The resulting conjunction is converted into clausal 
form through De Morgan's laws and it is then commu­
nicated to the LBMS. For instance, the probabilistic 
model defined by the two conditionals Po(a2[a1) = 0.2 
and Po (a2 l •a1 ) = 0.6 with Po (a1 ) = 0.5 may be ex­
pressed by the set of clauses: Po( at Va2) = 0.8, P0(a1 V 
•a2) = 0.7, Po( •at V a2) = 0.6, Po(•at V •a2) = 0.9. 
3 Ignorant Belief Networks 
Using the LBMS, it is possible to develop a new class 
of BBNs based on the LBMS and henceforth able to rea­
son with partially specified conditional dependencies 
(i.e. lacking some conditional probabilities) and inter­
val probability values. We call these BBNs Ignorant 
Belief Networks (IBNs). 
3.1 Definitions 
A BBN is a direct acyclic graph in which nodes repre­
sent stochastic variables and arcs represent conditional 
dependencies among those variables. A variable is de­
fined by a finite set of states representing the assign­
ment of a value to the variable. Each state in a variable 
is evaluated by a probability value. Each dependency 
is defined by the set of all conditional probabilities re­
lating the states of the parent variables to the states of 
the children variables. We will now describe how these 
definitions can be translated into the LBMS network. 
Variables In a BBN, all the states of a variable are 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive: the probability val­
ues assigned to all the states in a variable have to sum 
to unit. In an IBN, when a variable is defined, each 
state is communicated to the LBMS as a proposition. 
Moreover, a set of clauses is installed to ensure that 
the states of the variable are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. For all propositions at, ... , an in the LBMS 
representing the states of the variable, the disjunction 
a1 V • • • V an and all the conjunctions •( a0 1\ ai) (with 
i f- j) are asserted as true in the LBMS. When a proba­
bility value is assigned to a proposition a, representing 
a state of the variable, the LBMS receives the clause 
P* (ai+l V ... V an) = (1'1 where {ai+l• . . .  , an} is the 
set of proposition representing those states in the vari-
able that are still unknown, and (1' = 1- I:�=t P. (a�; ) ., 
i.e. the sum of the minimum probabilities of all known 
states in the variable. 
Dependencies Conditional dependencies among 
variables are defined by the conditional probabilities 
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among all the states of each variable. In an IBN, a con­
ditional P(flilat, ... , ate) = [p. p"], with i �{1, ... , k }, 
is represented as a consumer attached to each propo­
sition a1 • • •  ate. When the probability value of all 
states represented by the propositions a1 • • •  a,. is as­
signed, the two different clauses resulting from the ap­
plication of the De Morgan's laws to (a, !\au\ • . .  !\a1c) 
and ( ...,a,!\a1!\ ... !\ate ) are communicated to the LBMS. 
P( a0!\at!\ ... !\ate) and P( -.a,Aat!\ . . . 1\a,r,) are calcu­
lated according to a version of the Chain Rule ex­
tended to intervals: 
• 
P.(a,/\atA ... Aa,.) = II(P.(a;))P.(a,la�>···•a") 
j=l 
" 
P*(a;l\atA . . •  Aa,.) =II (P"(a;))P•(a;iat, ... ,a,.) 
j=l 
" 
P.(...,a;l\atl\ ... Aa,.) = II(P.(a;))(l- P"(aolat, ... ,a,.)) 
j=l 
• 
P"(""';Aat/\ ... Aa,) = II(P"(a;)) · (1- P.(a,lat1 ... ,a,.)) 
j=l 
The direction of a conditional dependency can be re­
versed by using the Inversion Rule and applying the 
above defined constraints to the resulting conditionals. 
3.2 Propagation 
From the theory of the TMss, the LBMS inherits the 
concept of consumer (de Kleer, 1986b). A consumer is 
a forward-chained procedure attached to each propo­
sition, that is fired when the truth-value of the propo­
sition is changed. The BMSs theory extends the defini­
tion of consumers from Boolean to probabilistic truth­
values. In the LBMS, a consumer can be defined as 
fueable when the minimum probability of its propo­
sition is raised, the maximum probability is lowered, 
or when the difference between the maximum and the 
minimum probability is decreased. 
When a variable is defined in the IBN, for each propo­
sition representing its states in the LBMS, two dif­
ferent consumers are defined. The first consumer 
is used to communicate to the LBMS the clause 
P*(ai+l V ... V an) =  u above defined, in order to en­
force the exhaustivity and exclusivity among states in 
a variable. A second consumer is used to encode the 
conditional probabilities among states, and it is de­
fined when a conditional dependency is installed in 
the network. When it is fired, it applies the Chain 
Rule to the defined conditional and communicates the 
appropriate clauses to the LBMS. A prior probability 
assignment to a state in a variable is communicated to 
the LBMS by assuming the corresponding proposition 
with the assigned probability. When the proposition is 
assumed, the attached consumers are fired, thus start­
ing the propagation process. 
Using consumers, IBNs do not perform any computa­
tion themselves, but rather act as a high-level knowl­
edge representation language, while the propagation 
of probabilities is performed by the LBMS. Hence, the 
computational cost of a propagation grows linearly in 
space and time with respect to the number of condi­
tional probabilities, even if the number of conditional 
probabilities needed to specify a conditional depen­
dency grows exponentially with the number of parent 
variables in the dependency. 
3.3 Properties 
In the introduction, we claimed that the use of a LBMS 
to develop BBNs could enhance their ability to deal 
with partially specified probabilistic information, to 
provide explanations and to handle contradictions. 
Ignoranee We can identify two different kinds of ig­
norance that can be represented in this framework: 
complete ignorance about a conditional probability 
and partial information about a conditional or prior 
probability in the network. Since the probability of 
both propositions and clauses in the LBMS is repre­
sented by probability intervals, IBNs are endowed with 
the ability to express both interval conditional prob­
abilities and interval prior probabilities. Moreover, 
since conditionals are locally defined and propagated, 
the reasoning process can start even without the full 
definition of the joint probability distribution. These 
features enable the IBNs to represent both the complete 
ignorance of a conditional probability and the partial 
information about a conditional or a prior probability. 
Explanation TMSs provide rational explanation for 
their conclusions by describing how these conclusions 
follow from the current set of assumptions (Forbus and 
de Kleer, 1992): they not only trace back the set of 
assumptions responsible for the conclusion but they 
also describe the derivation steps that lead from those 
assumptions to the conclusion to be explained. 
In the LBMS, each proposition is labeled with an in­
terval truth-value. Hence, the LBMS has to explain 
the assignment of both its lower and upper bound, 
that could have been derived from different assump­
tions trough different paths. In the current imple­
mentation, the lower and the upper bounds of the in­
terval associated to each propositions are indexed by 
the clause that set them during the constraint prop­
agation. To explain the assignment of a minimum or 
of a maximum probability to a proposition, the LBMS 
uses a quite simple algorithm. If no clause is sup­
porting the assignment, then the proposition is itself 
the assumption responsible for its own assignment. If 
the clause sets the value trough the application of the 
constraint 2, no assumption is responsible for the as­
signment because it is directly set by the clause. If 
the assignment is due to the application of the con­
straint 1, all the the literals but the one to be explained 
had their maximum probability lowered and the LBMS 
Priors 
[:fire:yes] 
[:fire:no] 
[tampering:yes] 
[tampering:no] 
Conditionals 
[smolte:yes] I [fire:yes] 
[smoke: yes] I [fire :no] 
[alara:yea] I [tire:yes] 1\ [tampering:yes] 
[alarm:yes] I [fire:yes] 1\ [tampering:no] 
[alarm:yes] I [fire:no] 1\ [tampering:yes] 
[alarm:yes] I [fire:no] 1\ [tampering:no] 
(leaving: yes] I (alarm: yes] 
[leaving:yes] I [alarm:no] 
[report: yes] I [leaving: yes] 
[report:yes] I [leaving:no] 
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Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
[0.7 o.�J 
[0.1 0.3] 
[0.8 o.�J 
[0.2 0.2] 
�?-8 o.�J 
[0 .2 0.2] 
[0.85 0.95] 
[0.05 0.15] 
[0.9 0.9] 
[0.1 0.1) 
[0.9 0.9] 
[0.1 0.1] 
[0 .9 0.9] [0.9 0.9j [
_
0.9 0.9) 
- - [0.01 0.01] 
(0.5 0.5] (0.5 0.5) (0.5 0.5) 
[0.99 0.99] [0.99 0.99] [0.99 0.99] 
-
- [0.85 0.85] 
[0.0001 0.0001] [0.0001 0.0001] [0.0001 0.0001] 
(0.8 0.9] [0.8 0.9) [0.88 0.88) 
[0.001 0 . 001] [0.001 0.001] [0.001 0.001] 
[0.7 0.8] [0.7 0.8] [0.75 0.75] 
[0.01 0.01] [0.01 0.01] [0.01 0.01] 
Table 1: Prior and conditional probabilities defining the network of the example. 
tries to explain this lowering. When an assumption 
is reached, it is returned as an explanation, together 
with the path followed to reach it. In the IBN, this 
mechanism has to be enhanced since the assumption 
of a proposition also causes the generation of clauses, 
namely, those clauses generated by conditionals and 
those supplementary clauses needed to enforce the ex­
haustivity and exclusivity among states in a variable. 
These clauses are labeled with the proposition that 
generated them, so that the explanatory algorithm of 
the IBN is able to follow also these additional paths 
in order to reach the assumptions and return them as 
explanations. 
Consistency One of the fundamental tasks of TMss 
is to detect and recover inconsistencies during the 
problem solving process. Since a BBN is known to be 
globally consistent if it is locally consistent, the LBMS 
maintains the consistency of a IBN by checking if one of 
the inconsistency conditions (5) and (6) is met. When 
an inconsistency arises, the LBMS uses the same al­
gorithm exploited in the explanatory process to trace 
back the assumptions responsible for the inconsistency, 
and ask for their retraction. The algorithm for retrac­
tion has been extended in order to take into account 
that the assumption of a state in a IBN generates addi­
tional clauses. Hence, in the current implementation, 
when a state in the IBN is retracted, the clauses gener­
ated by its assumption are deleted, and the constraints 
they impose over the network are relaxed. 
3.4 .An Example 
In a standard BBN, all the conditional probabilities 
that make up a conditional probability distribution are 
needed before any reasoning process can start. We will 
now show with an example how the IBN is instead able 
to reason from incomplete conditional probability dis­
tributions and underspecified prior probabilities. The 
example is composed of three steps. In the first step, 
we will communicate to the system the conditional 
probabilities listed in the first column of Table 1, and 
we will assign interval prior probabilities to the states 
in the root variables. Note that two conditional prob­
abilities are missing, and two have an interval value. 
In the second step, we will refine the prior probabili­
ties turning them into point-valued probabilities, and 
in the third step we will use the complete conditional 
probability distribution. Figures 1-4 show the graph­
ical representation of the networks generated in the 
various steps of the example. The pop-up windows 
over the variables graphically describe the probability 
interval (subset of [O 1]) associated to each one of their 
states. In each bar, the area between 0 and P.(a;) is 
black, the area between P"(a,) and 1 is white, and 
the area between P.(a;) and P"(a;) is gray. Thus, the 
width of the gray area is proportional to the ignorance 
about the probability. 
In Step 1, we have communicated to the IBN the condi­
tional probabilities listed in the first column of Table 1. 
The two conditional probabilities P( [smoke:yes] I 
[:fire:no]) and P([alarm:yesJI[:fire:no]t\ 
[tampering:yes]) are missing, and the two condi­
tional probabilities P( [leaving : yes] I [alarm: yes]) 
and P( [report: yes] I [leaving: yes]) have inter­
val values. Moreover, we have assumed the interval 
[0.7 0.9] as the prior probability for [fire:yes] and 
the interval [0.85 0.95] as the prior probability for 
[tampering:yes]. All the other probability intervals 
appearing in Figure 1 were set by the propagation al­
gorithm. 
Figure 2 shows a portion of the LBMS network gener­
ated by the propagation. Rectangles represent propo­
sitions and ovals are clauses. A solid arc linking a 
proposition to a clause means that the proposition 
appears unnegated in the clause, while a dashed arc 
means that it appears negated. The side bars display 
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Figure 1: The IBN defined by the underspecified con­
ditional model in Table 1 and interval prior probabili­
ties. 
Figure 2: A section of the LBMS network defined by 
the propagation of consumers for the IBN in Figure 1. 
the minimum and maximum probability values. The 
thicket border of the proposition [fire: yes] indicates 
that it is an assumption. 
The clauses P([tire:yes]V[fire:noJ) = (1 1] 
and P(-.[fire:yes]V-,[fire:no]) = [1 1] and the 
clauses P( [smoke: yes] V [smoke: no]) = [1 1] and 
P(-. [amoke: yes] V• [smoke :no]) = [1 1] enforce the 
exhaustivity and exclusivity property of the states 
of the variables Fire and Smoke, respectively. The 
clauses P(•[fire:yes] V [fire:no] V [smoke:yes]) 
= [0.91 0.93] and P(• [fire:yes) V [fire:no] 
V•[sllloke:yes]) = [0.19 0.37] named Condl are gen­
erated by the application of the Chain Rule with 
P( [fire: yes]) = [0. 7 0.9] and P( [smoke: yes] I 
[fire:yes]) = [0.9 0.9]. The underspecified prob­
ability of the proposition [smoke: yes] is due both 
to the interval-valued probability of the proposition 
[fire: yes] and to the absence of the conditional 
P([smoke :yes] I [fire :no]). 
Figure 3 shows how the probability intervals are up­
dated when we assume point-valued prior probabilities 
for the states of the root variables in the Step 2. Note 
that, due to the monotonic and incremental charac­
ter of the propagation algorithm, all the intervals in 
Figure 3 are subsets of the intervals in Figure 1. 
Finally, in Step 3 the complete conditional probabil­
ity distribution listed in the third column of Table 1 
Figure 3: The IBN defined by the underspecified con­
ditional distribution in Table 1 and point-valued prior 
probabilities. 
Figure 4: The IBN defined by the complete condi­
tional distribution in Table 1 and point-valued prior 
probabilities. 
is used. In this case, all the intervals degenerate to 
point-valued probabilities, and the IBN converges to 
the values of a standard BBN, as shown in Figure 4. Ta­
ble 2 summarizes the probability intervals associated 
to each proposition in each one of the steps described 
above. 
4 Conclusions 
We have introduced a new method to deal with par­
tially specified probabilistic models and we have ap­
plied it to develop a new class of BBNs, based on a 
LBMS, able to reason with incomplete information on 
the basis of an explicit representation of ignorance. 
Furthermore, the LBMS provides the IBN with the abil­
ity of detecting and handling contradictions, and of 
producing well-founded explanations for its conclu­
sions. We have applied the IBNs to the forecasting 
blood glucose concentration in insulin-dependent dia­
betic patients using underspecified probabilistic mod­
ds directly derived from a database containing the 
daily follow-up of 70 insulin-dependent diabetic pa­
tients, in which a very small subset of the complete 
conditional model needed to define a BBN was avail­
able. Instead of the 19200 conditional probabilities 
required, only 2262 were available (that is, less than 
12%), and most of them were affected by ignorance 
(the mean difference between the maximum and min-
Proposition Step 1 
[fire:yes] [0.7 0.9J 
[fire:no] [0.1 0.3] 
[tampering: yes] [0.85 0.95] 
[tampering:no] [0.05 0.15] 
[smoke: yes] [0.63 0.93] 
[smoke:no] [0.07 0.37] 
[alarm:yes] [0.332 0.697] 
[alarm:no] [0.303 0.668] 
[leaving:yes] [0.266 0.664] 
[leaving: no] [0.336 0.734] 
[l'eport: yes] [0.19 0.614] 
[report :no] [0.386 0.81] 
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Step 2 Step 3 
[0.8 0.8J 
[0.2 0.2] 
[0.8 O.SJ 
[0.2 0.2] 
[0.9 0.9] [0.9 0.9] 
[0.1 0.1] [0.1 0.1] 
[0.72 0.92] [0.722 0.722] 
[0.08 0.28] [0.278 0.278] 
[0.439 0.619] [0.592 0.592] 
[0.381 0.561] [0.408 0.408] 
[0.352 0.576] [0.522 0.522] 
(0.424 0.648] (0.478 0.478] 
[0.25 0.51] 
[0.49 0.75i 
[0.396 0.396] 
[0.604 0.604j 
Table 2: The probability intervals associated to propositions in the successive steps of the example. 
imuro probability of the conditionals was 0.19) (Ra­
moni et al., 1994). Still, the system was able to reason 
and make predictions, taking into account the igno­
rance about the distributions. 
Since BBNs are the reasoning cores of general decision 
making systems, called Inf1uence Diagrams, we are ex­
tending our work to develop a new class of Influence 
Diagrams (a sort of Ignorant Influence Diagrams) able 
to deal with sets of admissible decisions given bounds 
on distributions over the expected utilities. 
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